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Abstract 
The New Politics of the welfare state suggests that periods of welfare retrenchment present 
policy-makers with a qualitatively different set of challenges and electoral incentives 
compared to periods of welfare expansion. An unresolved puzzle for this literature is the 
relative electoral success of retrenching governments in recent decades, as evidenced by 
various studies on fiscal consolidations. This article points to the importance of partisan 
biases as the main explanatory factor. I argue that partisan biases in the electorate create 
incentives for incumbent governments to depart from their representative function and push 
the burden of retrenchment on the very constituencies that they owe their electoral mandate 
to (”Nixon-goes-to-China”). After offering a simple model on the logic of partisan biases, the 
article proceeds by testing the unexpected partisan hypotheses that the model generates. My 
findings from a cross-section-time-series analysis in a set of 25 OECD countries provide 
corrobarative evidence on this Nixon-goes-to-China logic of welfare retrenchment: 
governments systematically inflict pain on their core constituencies. Some of the losses that 
the core constituencies suffer during austerity, however, are recouped during fiscal 
expansions when traditional partisan patterns take hold. 
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Biting the Hand that Feeds: Reconsidering 
Partisanship in an Age of Permanent 
Austerity 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the wake of the financial crisis and the Great Recession of 2008-2009, 
governments across the industrialized world have accumulated 
unprecedented peace-time debt levels. If lessons from earlier episodes of debt 
stabilization are any guide, the arduous road towards sustainable public 
finances must involve deep cuts in public budgets both in core and in social 
expenditure items (Castles, 2007). Welfare budgets, across the board, are 
coming under intense pressure, creating a politically treacherous terrain for 
any government to tread. We may thus enter another era of “permanent 
austerity”, where scholarly consensus suggests a qualitatively different 
electoral logic of welfare policy from the era of welfare expansion. However, 
the vast empirical arsenal of electorally successful retrenchment episodes 
presents us with an empirical puzzle which has been largely unexplored by 
the welfare state literature. This article seeks to account for the relative 
electoral viability of welfare retrenchment by reconceptualising our 
understanding of partisanship in hard times.  
 
The notion of “permanent austerity”, according to the logic of the “New 
Politics “literature (Pierson, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2001) is a qualitatively different 
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political game from the prior era of welfare-state building because of 
entrenched constituencies, organized interests and the general popularity of 
welfare programmes. Outright assaults on the welfare state, even under 
ideologically highly committed conservative opponents, such as Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s, are thus unlikely. What one can 
expect, at best, is hidden adjustment whereby policy-makers attempt to 
introduce cost-saving measures in less visible welfare items – such as tax 
expenditures, indexation rules, etc. – to obfuscate the true impact of their 
policies (Howard, 1997; Hacker 2002, 2004). Open retrenchment, on the other 
hand, is likely to trigger electoral backlash. 
 
While the New Politics literature provided valuable insights on the apparent 
timidity of many conservative governments, a central piece in the electoral 
logic behind retrenchment has been largely overlooked. The number of 
electorally succesful overt retrenchment episodes is simply too high to ignore 
as idiosyncracies of the political context of the time and place (Alesina et al, 
1998, 2011; Mulas-Granados, 2006). This article seeks to revive the „New 
Politics” literature by building a bridge between the qualitatively different 
nature  and the apparent electoral viability of retrenchment. Specifically, a 
crucial factor that has been underemphasized, if not ignored, in welfare 
retrenchment debates is partisan loyalties. By incorporating the idea of  
loyalties into this debate, I point towards an important blame-avoidance 
strategy that re-election seeking incumbents can employ. I will argue that 
even highly visible adjustment is feasible when incumbent governments have 
a high level of electoral loyalty among certain constituencies. Relying on what 
I will call partisan biases, these governments have an incentive to shift a large 
part of retrenchment efforts onto their core constituencies in an effort to 
broaden their electoral appeal by sheltering tradtionally more hostile 
constituencies. The notion of partisan bias, in times of austerity, can thus 
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create a Nixon-goes-to-China environment where the axe falls on those 
welfare programmes where one would least expect. 
 
I will proceed with my argument in the following structure. After reviewing 
the current state of the partisanship-welfare state nexus, the next section will 
offer a more formal conceptualization of partisan bias in times of austerity 
leading up to my hypotheses to test. Next, I will operationalize my data and 
measurements. I then proceed to my empirical analysis in a time-series-cross-
section framework in a set of 25 OECD countries over  three decades. The 
final section concludes. 
 
 
The partisanship-welfare state nexus in an era of 
“permanent austerity” 
 
Literature Review 
 
The role of partisanship in shaping the post-war consensus in economic and 
social policymaking has been long recognized. Left-wing governments have 
been widely acknowledged as responsible for ensuring full employment in 
face of adverse economic shocks, providing decommodification to workers, 
or expanding social programmes to the socially weak in an attempt to protect 
against various sources of social risks along the life-cycle (Cusack, 2001 ; 
Esping-Andersen, 1990; Hibbs, 1977; Korpi, 1983). As slowing growth, 
structural unemployment, deindustrialization (Iversen and Cusack, 2000), 
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increased pace of globalization (Jahn, 2006; Swank and Steinmo, 2002)1, 
population aging and other concomitant social processes put an end to a 
period of welfare expansion in the 1970s, the importance of partisanship 
came under closer scrutiny (Huber and Stephens, 2001). 
 
In his seminal work on welfare-state resilience in the face of an international 
surge in conservative power. Pierson (1994) provides a comprehensive 
analysis of how welfare-recipients managed to block retrenchment efforts. 
The channels of this logic were twofold. On the one hand, mature welfare 
states created their own constituencies with vast organizational capacity and 
popular support to block reform efforts (e.g. the Association of American 
Pensioners in the US). Secondly, as Pierson’s subsequent works emphasize, 
governments also recognized the “tremendous electoral risks” of 
retrenchment policies (Pierson, 1996, p. 178). Even though their political 
mandate pointed towards welfare cuts, conservatives simply could not 
disregard the electoral risk that an outright assault on welfare programmes 
would entail. The “New Politics” literature thus generated two important 
research agendas to pursue for political economists. First, would permanent 
austerity really render partisanship irrelevant on the economic policy-making 
domain? Second, when governments occasionally do engage in retrenchment 
politics, are they doomed to suffer electoral punishment? 
 
In the decade following Pierson’s ground-breaking work, the answer to the 
first question was a qualified no. Soon after the publication of the New 
Politics of the Welfare State (Pierson, 2001) some of the “Old Politics” factors 
have staged a spectacular revival. Allan and Scruggs (2004), Bradley et al 
(2003), Korpi and Palme (2003), Kwon and Pontusson (2005), Swank (2005)                                                                   1 The so-called efficiency, or “race-to-the bottom” hypothesis, however, has been challenged from different angles (Rodrik 1997; Garrett 1998). 
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have all provided evidence that partisanship continues to shape welfare 
outcomes in a conventional way. By operationalizing welfare retrenchment 
(“welfare effort”) in a number of alternative ways (spending ratios, 
replacement rates, generosity indices etc.) these works concur that left-wing 
governments have been more successful in resisting the multiple sources of 
pressure on the welfare state. Although a few critiques pointed to the 
instability of the effect of partisanship over time (Huber and Stephens, 2001; 
Kittel and Obinger, 2003), the main thrust of the partisanship debate can be 
largely summarized as “partisanship still matters”. The welfare-state may 
have survived its conservative assault, but on the margin, left-wing 
governments have appeared its more reliable defendant nevertheless. 
 
There are doubts, however, about these “politics as usual” conclusions of 
welfare research. Political sociology has long recognized the rather dated 
conceptualization of what right-wing and left-wing constituencies are. The 
“decline of class voting” thesis, in particular, cast doubt on the relevance of 
the underlying class cleavage that partisan theory rests upon (Hibbs, 1977). In 
the most comprehensive edited volume to date contrasting different “bottom-
up” versus “top-down” accounts of changing class-voting in industrial 
democracies, the consensus that emerges is that class-voting has indeed 
declined in most countries over time (Evans and De-Graaf, 2013). Whether 
due to ideological convergence by parties (Evans, 2000; Evans and Tilly, 
2011), or to changes in underlying policy preferences across the electoral 
space (Clark and Lipset, 1991; Kitschelt, 1994), the implication for 
contemporary party politics is one of discontinuity. If traditional party 
systems structured by historical cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) give 
way to growing partisan fluidity, traditional conceptualization of 
partisanship is on a rather weak theoretical footing. 
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While the “New Politics” view on welfare retrenchment resonates well with 
the changing nature of partisan constituencies, it has been less successful in 
anticipating the electoral repercussions of retrenchment efforts. If welfare 
recipients were indeed as averse to welfare cuts as suggested by “New 
Politics”, one would expect electorates to behave accordingly at the polls.  
Yet, Alesina et al (1998; 2012) convincingly show that fiscal adjustments 
episodes had little, if any, predictive power on the re-election prospects and 
within-cycle popularity of incumbent governments. In a similar vein, Brender 
and Drazen (2008) find no direct evidence for deficits increasing incumbent 
popularity. Moreover, as subsequent contributions to this debate have 
confirmed (Ilera and Mulas-Granados, 2001; Mulas-Granados, 2006; Von 
Hagen et al, 2002), the composition of adjustments has been a strong 
predictor of the duration and hence the political viability of adjustment 
efforts: cuts in transfer programmes and public wages, in contrast to public 
investment cuts and tax hikes, have led to more permanent debt stabilization 
programmes. Studies treating social policy retrenchment, rather than fiscal 
adjustment as the main subject of analysis (Giger, 2010; Giger and Nelson, 
2011) have also arrived at similar results: these retrenchment efforts entail 
very limited systematic electoral punishment in their wake. While these 
contributions are largely silent on partisan dynamics driving the adjustment 
efforts, a related study by Alesina et al (2006) shows that when faced with 
fiscal crises, governments led by left parties tend to undertake adjustment 
earlier than their conservative rivals. Not only do these findings suggest that 
elections may not necessarily spell the death knell of retrenching 
governments, but they also potentially shed light on an unexpected partisan 
dynamics at play.  
 
In fact, when one takes a closer look at these retrenchment periods, the 
frequency of consolidation efforts initiated by the left is striking. While a 
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detailed analysis of retrenchment periods lies beyond the scope of this article, 
a few well-known cases bring the point home. The Swedish Social Democrats 
long-tenure in power under the premiership of Goran Persson following its 
banking and fiscal crisis in the early 1990s, New Zealand’s Labour 
governments under Helen Clark in the years preceding the Great Recession, 
Britain’s New Labour’s first term in office between 1997 and 2002, Denmark’s 
Social Democrat-led coalition governments in the second half of the 1990s all 
saw a significant reduction of cyclically-adjusted measures of social 
expenditure (OECD economic outlook database 92, 2012). Not only were 
these and other episodes successful in stabilizing public finances but they 
also resonated well with the electorate who returned these governments to 
power in a number of consecutive occasions. 
 
These unexpected partisan outcomes are closely linked to a crucial, but often 
neglected aspect of the electoral game: parties compete for each election with 
a priori held beliefs of the electorate on where these parties stand on different 
policy domains. These beliefs entail a degree of partisan loyalty between 
certain voting groups and political parties on the one hand, and create 
credibility (dis)advantages for these parties concerning their ability and 
willingness to deal with problem pressures, on the other2. Moreover, as 
Adams (2001) argues, these partisan loyalties imply a biased assessment of 
parties’ policy platforms by a part of the electorate, creating incentives for 
parties to deviate from the static predictions of median-voter models. For 
conceptually similar considerations,   Kitschelt (2001) concludes that the Left 
can more effectively deal with welfare pressures than the Right when it 
doesn’t face opposition parties that are credible defenders of the welfare                                                                   2 See Cukierman and Tomassi’s (1998) formal model that builds on the notion of credibility deficit to explain unexpected partisan outcomes. The examples include stabilization and pro-market policies conducted by Latin American presidents elected on a populist platform as well as land for peace policies undertaken by hawkish Israeli leaders. 
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state. The electoral importance and implications of the Left’s credibility 
advantage on the welfare state is perhaps best captured by Ross (2000) who 
emphasizes left-wing parties’ issue-association with welfare programmes 
that has been accumulated over more than half a century (p.164):  
 
“According to this logic, rightist parties should be more vulnerable in their 
retrenchment efforts than parties of the left—and especially so on explosive issues like 
welfare reform. The principal psychological mechanism conditioning voters’ response 
to issue-associations appears to be trust—specifically the opportunities trust provides 
for framing retrenchment initiatives in a manner that voters find acceptable if not 
compelling” 
 
These insights have crucial implications for the theoretical propositions of 
this article, outlined in the next sub-section. 
  
 
Theory: preference polarization under partisan - biased 
constituencies 
 
Before incorporating the idea of partisan biases in parties’ strategic positions 
on a policy space, a basic conceptualization of permanent austerity with 
regards to welfare preferences of the electorate is in order. Importantly, I 
assume endogenous preferences by the electorate whereby their preferred 
welfare provision takes into account the possibility frontier defined by 
permanent austerity. Specifically, I make the assumption that in times of 
“normal” or “old” politics, electoral preferences will point toward an 
expansion of multiple welfare programmes. In times of retrenchment politics, 
however, recognizing the trade-off nature of welfare provision, electoral 
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preferences will reflect the defence of one’s favoured program at the expense 
of the other(s).This assumption chimes in well with the seminal piece by 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) who elegantly model a war of attrition game 
where two constituencies attempt to shift the burden of adjustment onto the 
other side. Furthermore, this characterization of voters stuck in a 
redistributive battle for scarce resources have been borne out by a number of 
different scholars in the social policy literature (see Busemeyer, 2012 and 
Tepe and Vanhuysse, 2009 with regards to education policy and public 
pensions, respectively). 
 
More specifically, assume government provides two public services (or two 
welfare programmes) in the political economy: X and Y3 with two distinct 
constituencies (group 1 and group 2) benefiting from them. Figure 1 is a 
stylized illustration of the pre-retrenchment period (left panel) compared to 
“permanent austerity” (right panel). In the first period, as high growth and 
low debt levels allowed the expansion of the welfare state without running 
into financial constraints, the two groups are expected to forge an alliance for 
the parallel expansion of the programmes: their preferences are relatively 
proximate. One can conceptualize this idea by regular (circular) indifference 
curves for two groups of voters: group 1 preferring higher provision in good 
X and group 2 preferring higher level of provision in Y. Both groups, 
however, are willing to trade off X for Y at similar rates at any given 
combination of X and Y. As a result, given the budget constraint of the 
welfare state, ideal points A and B are relatively close to each other.   
 
Once permanent austerity hits, the mutual expansion of spending 
programmes gives way to a distributional conflict between the two groups                                                                   3 For illustration’s sake, the two welfare programmes can be thought of as unemployment programmes for the working age and pension programmes for the retired population. 
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under a tighter budget constraint. Translating this into visual representation 
on the right-hand panel, indifference curves for the two groups are now very 
different. The most intuitive way to understand the new scenario is that for 
group 1 (2), a higher level of Y (X) is required to leave it at the same level of 
utility compared to the pre-retrenchment scenario. Alternatively, at any given 
combination of X and Y, the terms of trading off X for Y for the two groups 
will be sharply different. As a result, given the new budget constraint of the 
welfare state, the ideal points A’ and B’ will be further apart compared to the 
pre-retrenchment period.  
 
Figure 1. Indifference curves and ideal points for two groups of voters during 
welfare-state building (left) and retrenchment (right) 
  
 
The next step in the analysis is translating this distributional conflict to a 
single-issue space for X. The incumbent party – labelled S for social-
democratic – tries to optimize its vote share among two groups, its traditional 
core constituency and a target group that it tries to sway over.  The groups are 
caught in a distributional conflict on the provision of X, as the core is 
interested in its maintenance/expansion while the target is interested in its 
reduction in order to free up resources for its own preferred program. 
Intuitively, the two groups along the single-issue space are distributed 
bimodally, with the two peaks located at the two groups’ “ideal points” of 
B’ 
Y, $ 
X, $ 
B 
A 
A’ 
X, $ 
Y, $ 
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provision level4. Therefore, in Figure 2, the core constituency for party S has 
an ideal preference point Pc. The target constituency5 of party S has an ideal 
preference point Pt. The core constituency is the one with preferences towards 
the bottom-right corner of Figures1 and 2 (point B, B*), in other words who 
benefit more from the provision of Y. The target constituency is the one with 
preferences towards the upper-left corner in Figures  1 and  2 (point A, A*), in 
other words who prefer less provision of Y to allow for increased provision of 
X.  
Figure 2. The preference distribution of two g roups of voters on a single-issue 
space 
   
 
The incumbent government party’s vote-maximizing strategy is to find an 
ideal location along the issue space (ranging from less to more provision of 
X). The farther it locates from the ideal preference point of its core (target) 
constituency the more votes it will lose among the respective constituencies. 
Specifically, I adopt a quadratic loss function for the vote share the 
government faces with a minor, but crucial modification. Building on the 
logic of  partisan biases, I assume that party S, the natural guardian of X,                                                                   4 This bimodal distribution follows from a stylized restriction of the electoral space to the two groups under analysis; since each group has a favoured program to defend, their preference distribution, following from Graph  1, will be polarized around the two ideal points.           5 I use the notion of target constituency to emphasize the idea that in order to increase its electoral support, the incumbent must make policy concessions to traditionally antagonistic groups. 
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enjoys positive (negative) partisan bias among the core (target) constituency 
because of its historical commitment (or ideology) to  the core group and its 
preferred program, X. In political terms, this idea can be expressed by an 
asymmetric evaluation of a policy shift by the core and the target group: if 
the government reduces the provision of X, the core can expect that due to 
party S’s ties to the core, this shift doesn’t fully reflect S’s true preferences 
and it will thus revert back to more provision in the future. In a similar vein, 
being distrustful of S’s true preferences, the target group will reward S’s shift 
by a smaller vote gain compared to a similar shift undertaken by a 
traditionally less hostile party. The vote loss function of S can thus be 
expressed as follows: 
 
F(V) = − (𝑃𝑐 − S)2α −(𝑆 − 𝑃𝑡)2β 
 
where 0<α<1 and 2>β>1 are two partisan bias parameters to reflect the idea 
above6. The constraints of these parameters reflect the idea that the vote loss 
function can be either amplified (by β) or dampened (by α) as a function of 
the relative partisan biases of the ruling party among the two constituencies. 
By minimizing the loss function with respect to S, the first-order condition 
gives 
 
dV
dS = 2 (Pcα + Ptβ)  − 2(Sα + Sβ) = 0 
 
Which solves to: 
 
1) S =  Pcα+Pt β
α+β                                                                   6 The range of parameters α and β are constrained between 0 and 1 and 1 and 2, respectively as a matter of convenience to allow for a symmetric range around 1, a scenario with no partisan bias among either of the constituencies. 
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Comparing this result to a party with no partisan bias among the electorate 
(ie. α = 1;, β = 1) the vote loss function simplifies to: 
 
F(V) = − (𝑃𝑐 − S)2−(𝑆 − 𝑃𝑡)2 
 
Which results in the solution of: 
 
2) S = Pc+Pt2  
 
Which leads party S to locate exactly half-way between the two groups’ ideal 
points. To the extent permanent austerity sharpens the trade-off between the 
provision of two welfare programmes, one can expect that austerity shocks 
trigger into redistributive preferences by moving Pt to the left towards Pt* on 
Figure 2, reflecting the target group’s attempt to safeguard its own preferred 
programme, Y. What happens to S’s vote maximization location in response 
to a one-unit leftward shift of Pt? Under a government with no partisan bias 
among either of the constituencies, the result is straightforward from 2): S 
follows Pt by half a unit. However, once partisan biases are introduced, the 
impact on S’s new location is given by taking the first derivative of 1) with 
respect to Pt, resulting in:  β
α+β. It is easy to see that given the constraints of 
the partisan bias parameters, this fraction is strictly >  1 2 and asymptotically 
converges to 1 with β going to 2 and α going to 0. In other words, the 
austerity shock is expected to result in the greatest move against the core 
constituency when the incumbent government has high partisan bias (low α) 
among them. 
 
The result of this simple model suggests two hypotheses to test in the 
empirical section of this paper. The two hypotheses offer two different 
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conceptualizations of permanent austerity. According to the first (baseline) 
hypothesis, austerity implies a permanent preference shift for voters (from 
Figure IV.1 to Figure IV.2) as they recognize the inevitable trade-off between 
the welfare programmes that the government delivers – in the present and 
the future. Put differently, voters will permanently abandon their prior 
expectation of welfare consensus on the mutual expansion of welfare 
programmes and will sharpen their defence of their preferred ones. 
Alternatively, according to the second (conditional) hypothesis, voters’ 
preference change will follow the short-term exigencies of austerity politics. 
In other words, periods of retrenchment will reflect the preference alignment 
of Figure IV.2, but in times of relative prosperity, regular preferences will 
dictate no polarization between the two groups’ ideal points (Figure I) and 
hence no Nixon-goes-to-China effect. Stated more concisely, therefore: 
 
H(baseline): Since the mid-1970s, welfare retrenchment is guided by a Nixon-goes-
to-China logic. Parties enjoying high degree of partisan bias among certain social 
groups are more likely to inflict pain on these groups when structuring their welfare 
budgets. 
 
H(conditional): Since the mid-1970s, governments occasionally had to surrender 
their commitments to welfare programmes in their effort to stabilize debt levels. 
Only in times of retrenchment do we observe a Nixon-goes-to-China logic, but when 
budgetary exigencies are absent traditional partisan effects dominate. 
 
Operationalizing the partisan bias parameter and different fiscal periods as 
well as introducing our data and measurement will be the subject of the next 
section. 
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Partisan bias in times of “permanent austerity”: data and 
measurement 
 
As our literature review and theoretical propositions indicated, partisan 
biases could be crucial modifying factors in providing room for manoeuvre 
for certain political parties to engage in austerity politics when in 
government. The problem of course is that partisan biases are hard to 
observe. The simplest approach would be to rely on traditional party family 
labels as the bulk of partisanship debate in welfare state research has done 
(Huber and Stephens, 2001, Alan and Scruggs, 2004). The crucial limitation 
of this approach – as highlighted by the earlier discussion – is that with the 
decline of class voting, traditional party family labels are considerably less 
useful in capturing the political representation of socioeconomic interests 
than they were at the time of early partisan theory  (Alesina, 1987, Hibbs, 
1977). An alternative solution would be to look at policy stances of political 
parties based on electoral manifestos (Finseraas and Vernby, 2011; Haupt 
2010; Kim and Fording, 2002; Ward et al, 2011). However, it is a highly 
dubious assumption whether occasional (written) emphases on certain issue 
priorities automatically translate into partisan loyalties that my argument 
requires for empirical testing7. 
 
I therefore opt for yet another approach which relies on revealed preferences 
of voters. I argue that partisan biases should be reflected by the relative 
appeal of given parties to social groups. This relative appeal is measured by 
the vote share parties can expect to obtain among members of a given social                                                         7 See also Budge and Bara (2001) for a critical review on the reliability of  data from the  Comparative Manifesto Project 
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group relative to the overall vote share in the population, based on annual 
opinion data from Eurobarometer and ISSP (details in Appendix 1).   
 
More specifically, I constructed a group-specific relative support measure8 
(RSP from here on), which is defined as follows: 
 
RSPgp=𝑉𝑔𝑝−𝑉𝑡𝑝𝑉𝑡𝑝  
 
Where Vgp and Vtp are the vote (intention) share of party P among social 
group G and and its total vote (intention) share, respectively. The logic 
behind this measure is that the deviation of group-specific support from 
overall support (numerator) is divided (standardized) by the overall strength 
of the party (denominator). A 5% vote share deviation from its overall 
support share is surely more important for a fringe party in a multiparty 
system than for a catch-all party in a two-party system. Standardizing by 
party strength thus ensures that group-specific deviation from overall 
support is measured relatively to the party’s overall strength. Accordingly, 
the obtained measure takes on the value 0 when the group-specific support 
share equals the overall support for the party. It takes on the value -1 when 
no member of the given group votes for the party. If the group-specific 
support is double that of the overall support, RSP will equal 19. Therefore, an 
alternative reading of partisan bias is the extent to which parties are 
                                                        8 This is a modification of a popular measure in the class voting literature called the Alford Index, defined by the % of manual occupations voting left minus the % of non-manual occupations voting left (Alford, 1963).  While the Alfold Index could be modified to allow for more meaningful post-industrial occupational categories than the crude “manual” vs. “non-manual”  distinction, I argue that there are two other advantages of this new measure: first, it is party-specific, which is crucial for multiparty systems with more than one left parties. Second, it is standardized, ie. it takes into account the size of party in question.          9 While in theory RSP can exceed 1 (when the group-specific support is more than twice of the overall support) in the empirical distribution of the cases it is very seldom above 1. Therefore, it is practical and convenient to think of -1 and 1 as the lower and upper bounds of RSP. 
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beholden to certain constituencies measured by the relative electoral support 
among them. 
 
With RSP thus defined, the next task is to pin down the social groups of 
interest. One concern is identifying groups with clear material interest in 
welfare programmes. Another was size: overly small groups’ (less than 5% 
of the electorate) electoral support is notoriously hard to reliably measure in 
electoral surveys. Moreover, including small groups in the analysis is also 
problematic for their likely limited electoral influence. My choice thus fell on 
two important voting constituencies that are comparable in size (each 
comprising around 20% of the voting population) and constitute important 
clienteles of the welfare state: pensioners and low-/semi-skilled working age 
individuals. The identification of pensioners was unproblematic as both 
survey series ask respondents about their current job status. Identifying the 
latter group was based on occupation categorization in the two survey series 
(see Appendix for details). 
 
To offer a brief illustration of the utility of our RSP measure, it is helpful to 
recall partisan theory’s conceptualization of partisan preferences. According 
to traditional partisan approaches, party preferences can be approximated by 
low-skilled workers constituting the core electoral bloc behind social-
democratic parties while the middle classes should overwhelmingly support 
conservative and liberal parties. Figure 3 depicts the average RSP for 
workers and the middle-class for these three party-types over the time-span 
of our analysis. 
 
 
 
 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
   18 
Figure 3. Average RSP for workers (top row) and the middle classes (middle and     
bottom rows) across their traditional party families* 
 
 
 * Horizontal red line indicates the sample average over the study period. 
 
While the general pattern confirms partisan theory, the variation among 
parties in different countries is far from trivial. Average social-
democratic/labour RSP for workers ranges from 0.58 in Luxemburg to -0.3 in 
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Slovenia. Regarding the middle class’s alignment with conservative parties, 
their RSP ranges from 0.84 in Finland to  -0.31 in New Zealand’s smaller 
conservative party. Liberal parties’ middle class RSP is unambiguously in 
the positive territory, but the range is still remarkable: from 0.94 in Belgium 
to 0.03 for the Canadian liberals. This wide variation calls into doubt the 
analytical value of party family labels and suggests that even historically 
similar party types owe their mandate to a fundamentally different 
composition of electoral blocs today. 
 
Turning to the main dependent variable of our study, welfare retrenchment, 
a lively debate has emerged on measurement issues. Allan and Scruggs 
(2004) cogently argue that looking at the policy parameters of welfare 
programmes (replacement rates, eligibility criteria etc.) is a superior measure 
of welfare retrenchment to conventional expenditure data, because as 
Esping-Andersen famously remarked, “it is hard to imagine that anyone 
struggled for spending per se” (1990, p.21). Green-Pedersen (2004), by 
contrast argues that what has become known as the “dependent variable 
problem” should be resolved by conceptualization rather than rules of 
thumb. Moreover, critics of spending measures - see Starke’s (2006) excellent 
review in this regard - often make the valid point that spending is driven by 
a number of structural developments in welfare states, such as aging, 
structural unemployment and deindustrialization (Huber and Stephens, 
2001; Iversen and Cusack, 2000).  
 
An appropriate choice of our dependent variable and the estimation strategy 
must take these considerations seriously. For our purposes, however, a 
number of other considerations weigh against these arguments. First, as the 
welfare regime literature (Esping-Andersen, 1990, Iversen and Wren, 1998) 
has long emphasized, welfare services constitute a significant part of 
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“welfare effort” in a number of welfare states, especially among the 
Nordic/Social-democratic types. Since spending data on cash and in-kind 
captures these services (elderly care facilities for instance) which the welfare 
entitlement measures relying on replace rates do not, the former constitutes a 
more encompassing and thus more appropriate measurement to use. 
Secondly, much of the welfare retrenchment debate revolves around the goal 
of cost-containment (Pierson, 2001; Starke, 2006) which, in contrast to 
Esping-Andersen’s famous remark above, is primarily a spending-related 
issue and hence not epiphenomenal to the study of interest as he argued (1990, 
p.19). In other words, if our primary object of interest is welfare 
retrenchment in the context of (permanent) austerity, expenditure outcomes 
per se are of high conceptual relevance for this study. On a related note, a lot 
of retrenchment reforms do not directly impact on the welfare of current 
beneficiaries (a rise in the retirement age would be a typical example) and 
hence do not show up in current expenditure outcomes. However, since my 
constituency-based partisanship measure (see the foregoing discussion) 
relies on current beneficiaries of welfare programmes, it is important to 
prioritize those reforms in my empirical measures that actually affect these 
groups (e.g. changed pension indexation formula). Expenditure measures go 
a long way in taking this consideration into account. Thirdly, the valid 
concerns on demand- as opposed to policy-driven spending outcomes are 
less problematic than they first seem; careful control variables (see a more 
detailed discussion below) on these structural drivers are easily available 
and applicable for quantitative analysis, allowing the researcher to clean the 
estimate of theoretical interest of the confounding effect of these structural 
driving forces.  Last but not least, expenditure data is widely available, 
expanding the empirical horizon to countries and time periods that are not 
covered by the commonly used entitlement datasets. 
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Accordingly, I chose programme-specific expenditure data (as a % of GDP) as 
the dependent variable of interest. As previously mentioned, one of the main 
considerations in defining social groups was to clearly align them with 
welfare programmes where they have a vested interest. For the first group, 
the pensioner population, old age pension expenditure is an obvious 
program that satisfies this criterion. Workers face a number of risks along the 
life-cycle so it less obvious which program they are most prepared to defend. 
I argue that given the occupation categories that constitute this group in this 
study, unemployment is probably the most prominent of these risks: a 
shrinking manufacturing base in advanced economies, global competition, 
structural employment, dualized labour markets (Rueda, 2005) etc. all expose 
this low-skilled group to the risk of job loss (Rehm, 2011). I thus chose 
unemployment benefits as the core program of workers.   
 
In addition to these core measures, I also adopt a broader measure for the 
two groups that take into account other welfare programmes that are 
potentially relevant for their interest. For pensioners, the broader measure 
includes health expenditure and survivor benefits. The elderly are frequent 
users of healthcare facilities, regular consumers of subsidized drugs as well 
as the main beneficiaries of survivor programmes. For workers, these 
complementary programmes largely address what the welfare state 
literature identifies as “new social risks” in the post-industrial economy 
(Bonoli, 2005; Hauserman, 2010): measures to fight structural unemployment 
by activation policies, family policies to ease women’s entry and re-entry in 
the labour force after child-bearing and so on. I thus included active labour 
market policies, incapacity and family benefits because these policies 
primarily target working age individuals. Given their relatively low-income 
status, family and incapacity benefits are important complements to 
workers’ income especially when faced with temporary income loss due to 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
   22 
sickness, maternity/paternity leave, etc. Active labour market policies in turn 
can increase reemployment opportunities for workers faced with a high risk 
of job loss and a generally higher risk profile in their sector of employment 
(Cusack et al, 2006).  
 
To summarize, the core dependent variables of interest are old age pensions 
and unemployment benefits  for pensioners and the low-/semi-skilled 
working-class, respectively. The broader measures for the two groups will 
additionally include health care expenditure and survivor benefits for 
pensioners and incapacity, family benefits and active labour market policies 
for workers. In the empirical analysis, all these spending measures are 
expressed in % of GDP. 
 
The final variable of main interest to discuss is the fiscal consolidation 
variable. The second hypothesis addresses the possibility that the era of 
“permanent austerity” should not be understood in a homogenous manner, 
but rather as extended efforts to stabilize/bring down debt levels 
interspersed with times with less pressure on public budgets. There is, of 
course, considerable cross-national variation as well in the extent to which 
characterizing the last three to four decades as permanent austerity is 
appropriate. Recognizing this heterogeneity I followed Alesina and 
Ardagna’s (2009) approach who identify large fiscal efforts by changes in the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance of the general government (capb). 
Specifically, they separate their empirical sample into three periods: 1) 
consolidation periods, where the capb increases by more than 1.5% of 
potential GDP; 2) expansion periods, where the capb drops by at least 1.5% 
of potential GDP 3) “neutral” periods in between. While the 1.5% threshold, 
as any other, is admittedly arbitrary, the advantage of this relatively high 
threshold is to rule out idiosyncratic and one-off changes in the fiscal stance. 
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Setting the threshold high allows the researcher to pin down periods where 
changes in the fiscal stance are policy-driven.  In addition to measuring 
adjustment periods through these consolidation and expansion dummies, I 
also introduce the capb as a continuous variable to test my second 
hypothesis in a linear functional form. 
 
In addition to the main variables of theoretical interests, a number of control 
variables will be essential for the analysis. Most importantly, structural 
developments driving programme-specific expenditure outcomes have to be 
correctly specified. First, as expenditure data is expressed as a % of GDP, 
GDP growth has to be accounted for to take into account the denominator 
effect. Moreover, growth has an indirect effect on expenditure as the cyclical 
position of the economy affects the pool of beneficiaries of welfare claimants. 
Secondly, unemployment will be taken into account for the worker-related 
specifications because it increases the pool of unemployed, directly 
impacting unemployment benefits and indirectly other welfare expenditure 
for the working age. For pensioners-related expenditure, in turn, aging will 
be controlled for in the form of the % of elderly (people aged above 60) in the 
population. In addition to these structural developments, a political party 
family control will be used to disentangle the effects of partisan biases (RSP) 
from the traditional effects of ideology (party families). Although the 
descriptive analysis above has shown that RSP is by no means just an 
equivalent measure for party family labels, I nevertheless control for party 
families to purge the estimates from the possibly confounding effects of 
ideology.  
 
In addition to these controls, a number of further variables could be of 
potential theoretical interest. One common theme in the welfare 
retrenchment literature is the varying degree of leeway different incumbent 
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governments have in enacting policy change (Bonoli, 2001; Obinger, 2002; 
Tsebelis, 2002). A large number of veto players – coalition partners, second 
chambers, presidential veto etc. – can create policy deadlock even when the 
government’s partisan leaning (ie. its constituency composition) is otherwise 
favourable towards welfare retrenchment. Hence I included a political 
constraint index (POLCON III) index (Henisz, 2006), a popular composite 
index ranging between 0 and 1 to capture the political constraint that a 
government faces at any point in time. Furthermore, another important 
theme in the welfare retrenchment literature is the impact economic 
integration and globalization have on welfare state stability. To adjudicate 
between two competing claims on the directional effect of globalization in 
the empirical literature10, I included a sub-component of the popularly used 
Dreher index that captures economics flows and restrictions on movements 
of goods, services and capital (Dreher, 2006). Finally, I included an EMU 
dummy to pick up the potentially constraining effect of the currency union 
on public budgets and hence on welfare programmes. However, none of 
these additional control variables were remotely close to achieving statistical 
significance in any of the models so I discarded them from the final analysis. 
 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of this article, a final note on the 
partisan variables is in order. The welfare state literature, as a rule, measured 
incumbency by incorporating all parties holding cabinet portfolios. This is 
warranted on the grounds that government portfolios offer the primary tools 
for parties to affect policy. It is not all that clear, however, that a numerical 
(%) measure of junior coalition parties is appropriate to determine their 
influence on welfare decisions: a small coalition partner controlling the 
environmental and the transport ministry, for instance may have                                                         10 See Meinhard and Potrafke (2012) for an excellent summary, literature review and empirical re-examination of the so-called “efficiency” and “compensation” hypotheses. 
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considerably less policy-making power than one controlling welfare-related 
portfolios. Focusing on the leading government party is thus arguably a safer 
choice because the control over the premiership and the finance ministry11 
(typically the case for large senior coalition members) gives the leading party 
considerable, if not predominant leverage in acting according to its own 
welfare preferences. Moreover, the clarity-of-responsibility thesis in electoral 
research (Duch and Stevenson, 2008; Powell and Whitten, 1993) has 
consistently shown that senior parties are held more responsible for electoral 
outcomes, hence their strategic incentives for Nixon-goes-to-China policy-
making should be also sharper. Finally, reliably measuring group-specific 
RSP from electoral surveys is extremely difficult for small parties due to the 
limited (sub)sample size. Although the omission of coalition partners should 
be kept in mind as a possible limitation, these considerations suggest that 
focusing on leading parties is a reasonable choice. 
 
 
Empirical analysis: Nixon-goes-to-China in times of 
welfare retrenchment 
 
To begin the discussion on specification issues for the empirical analysis, I lay 
out the general time series-cross section model to be estimated, taking the 
general form of: 
 
Yit = β0 +∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑘1   + αi+ µt + eit 
                                                                  11 Although traditional models on portfolio allocation (Laver and Shepsle, 1990) assumed a great degree of ministerial autonomy, a large number of countries have taken radical steps towards strengthening the role of finance ministers in the allocation of public funds (Hallerberg et al, 2009) 
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Where Yit is the endogenous (dependent) variable of the model, ∑ 𝛽𝑘 ∗ 𝑋𝑘𝑖𝑡𝑘1   
is a vector of k regressors (may or may not including lagged dependent 
variable(s) to account for dynamics), αi, µt are unit- and time-specific 
intercepts and eit is an observation-specific error term. The observations are 
taken from a sample of 25 OECD countries – including 5 new member states 
of the European Union – over more than 3 decades (1975-2007)12 that largely 
covers the period of “permanent austerity”. 
 
The first concern that immediately arises is to what extent the main variable 
of our interest, RSP can be regarded as exogenous so that the weak 
exogeneity assumption – E(Xiteit) = 0 – holds. If that assumption is violated, 
the estimated parameters of interest will be biased. Theoretically, we have 
strong expectation to assume that the contemporaneous RSP and 
expenditure data are mutually endogenous, as the relative party support 
among different constituencies may very well depend on welfare spending 
decisions. To circumvent this possibly severe endogeneity bias, I “fixed” my 
RSP measure to the year that a new government comes to power. For the 
entire term of the incoming government, the group-specific RSP will reflect 
the preceding four years’ average of the RSP measure at the beginning of the 
term13. Measuring RSP from the pre-incumbency period is a theoretically 
informed way to capture the notion of a government’s “electoral mandate” 
and goes a long way in addressing endogeneity concerns. 
 
                                                                 12 In practice, program-specific expenditure data is available from 1980 only, so that year is the starting point for all panels. Moreover, for some of the countries in the sample have different availabilities for expenditure data and electoral surveys, resulting in an unbalanced panel for the analysis.          13 Taking a four-year average as opposed to just the annual observation when the government comes to power helps to reduce sampling error which would pose serious problems if RSP was measured based on a single electoral survey. The four-year moving average RSP series are thus 
considerably smoother than the very noisy “base” series. The window of four rather than some other moving average window was chosen to reflect the length of a typical electoral cycle. 
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A second important theoretical consideration is the functional form of the 
dependent variables. While level specifications are usually interpreted as 
models predicting “long-run” effects, first-difference specifications are better 
suited to capture “short-run” dynamics. For our purposes, it is the latter 
aspect that we mostly care about: to what extent do incumbent governments 
adopt retrenchment policies – often in the face of financial pressures to take 
urgent decisions – as a function of their electoral constituencies. Moreover, as 
Kittel and Winner (2005) discussed in their re-analysis of Garrett and 
Mitchell’s (2001) public expenditure data, the level form of these series can 
be often non-stationary with a coefficient of the autoregressive term being 
very close to unity. First differencing the dependent variable thus also has a 
technical advantage wherein the risk of running spurious regressions is 
minimized. As for the structural predictors (old age ratio, unemployment 
and growth) the first two of these entered with a first-differenced format in 
the specifications, but I left growth – which is theoretically speaking a 
“change variable” itself – in its level form to control for the denominator 
effect. The political variables (RSP and party types) were introduced in 
levels14. 
 
The first step of my estimation strategy was to investigate unit (and time) 
heterogeneity by testing for inclusion of fixed effects (αi and µt) in the 
models. If unobserved unit-/time-specific characteristics – and hence the 
error terms – are correlated with our regressors, the estimated coefficients 
will suffer from omitted variable bias. However, in the absence of this source 
of bias, a random-effects model is preferable as it allows for more precise 
(more efficient) estimates. First, I began with the inclusion of time-dummies                                                                   14 Unlike with the structural variables where it is theoretically justified to expect that “changes 
drive changes”, political variables have a different logic: government continuity – hence non-changing RSP and party family variables – is very well compatible with changing expenditure outcomes. 
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because of well-known periods of time-specific shocks (e.g. Maastricht 
process) that simultaneously affected many countries in the sample. 
Predictably, an F-test on the joint significance of these time dummies 
(p<0.001 in all cases) allows us to convincingly reject the null hypothesis of 
no time-specific effects. As for unit-heterogeneity, F tests for different 
dependent variables and models provided mixed results: for unemployment 
benefit programmes, for instance, there is no evidence for unit-specific 
effects; for old-age spending, however, the joint effects are marginally 
significant. I thus proceeded to a set of Hausman tests to check whether the 
more efficient random effects estimator is also consistent15 (the H0 of the 
test). These tests unambiguously indicated that where unit-specific effects 
are present (e.g. for old-age spending), these effects are not correlated with 
the regressors, hence the omission of fixed effects to gain a more efficient 
random effects estimator is warranted. That said, I will provide fixed effects 
specifications as robustness check in section 5 to examine the stability of the 
findings. 
 
With these random effects specifications – with time dummies – as our 
benchmark, I proceeded to test for violations of the standard Gauss-Markov 
conditions (Beck, 2001) under which regular standard errors of individual 
coefficients may be severely inflated, yielding invalid test results. The first 
possible source of these violations is panel heteroskedasticity. This is a 
highly plausible scenario because countries with higher levels of program-
specific spending are expected to display higher fluctuations (annual 
changes) around the mean. These expectations were confirmed by a 
modified Wald-test which strongly rejected the null hypothesis of 
homoskedastic errors across units (p<0.001). Proceeding to the covariances of                                                                   15 The more technical null hypothesis that the Hausman specification test tests against is whether the unit- (country-) specific effects are correlated with the regressors, which would render the random effects or fully pooled OLS estimates biased (Bartels, 2008). 
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the residuals, valid standard error estimates require independence across the 
rows in the variance-covariance matrix of the errors (no contemporaneous 
correlation) as well as in the columns (no autocorrelation in panels). Based 
on a Pesaran test, most of the models appear to be contaminated by 
contemporaneous correlation (test results are provided in the Appendix). 
First order serial correlation16, on the other hand was detected only in the 
unemployment benefit series, indicating that changes in unemployment 
benefit programmes have a high degree of “stickiness”. In other words, a 
given change in unemployment benefit spending is likely to entail a similar 
change in the next period. To model this feature of the unemployment 
benefit data, I included a lagged dependent variable in the specifications. 
Regressing residuals on past residuals after this LDV specification showed 
no remaining serial correlation in the data.  
 
Equipped with these diagnostic results17, I estimated the random effects 
models correcting for panel-heteroskedasticity and cross-sectional 
correlation, using panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by Beck and 
Katz (1995) as a superior alternative to the FGLS-based Parks method. 
 
Table 1 summarizes the main findings on old-age spending (time dummies 
suppressed from this and all subsequent tables). The baseline model shows 
that structural variables are important determinants of spending outcomes: 
higher growth and a larger increase in the ratio of the elderly decreases and 
increases the share of output devoted to old age expenditure, respectively. 
By contrast, the Henisz index, our proxy for veto players in the political 
systems, did not achieve statistical significance in any of the models hence I 
omitted it from the final analysis.                                                                    16 A Wooldridge (Lagrange Multiplier) test was used to test against the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation in the data.           17 All diagnostic test results are provided in the  Appendix  
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Table 1. Models explaining old-age spending in OECD countries†  Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II RSP_pensioners -0.215 -0.249 -0.343 -0.204  (2.79)*** (4.37)*** (4.71)*** (5.23)*** growth -0.042 -0.038 -0.045 -0.043  (3.32)*** (3.39)*** (3.82)*** (3.67)*** 
Δoldage 39.712 39.261 36.847 37.266  (5.57)*** (4.19)*** (4.21)*** (4.79)*** conservative  -0.061 -0.046 -0.048   (1.49) (1.10) (1.27) christdem  0.044 0.049 0.041   (1.44) (1.50) (1.27) liberal  -0.002 -0.001 -0.003   (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) other  -0.100 -0.083 -0.077   (2.34)** (2.15)** (1.91)* Consolidation   -0.072     (1.68)*  Expansion   -0.011     (0.25)  RSP_pensioners*Consolidation   0.238     (2.19)**  RSP_pensioners*Expansion    0.854     (4.50)***  
Δcapb    -0.020     (2.45)** 
RSP_pensioners* Δcapb    -0.091     (2.54)** 
R2 0.19 0.21 0.25 0.25 
N 489 415 392 392 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are random-effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors(t-statistics in parenthesis). 
 
 
The main variable of interest, pensioner-specific RSP is highly significant in 
the expected (negative) direction. Looking at the extended model with party 
family controls, the only noteworthy finding is the non-significance of most 
party family variables18. Only the “other” category (comprising very few 
cases where the leading party did not belong to any of the four major party 
families) displays significant differences compared to the benchmark, social-
democratic category. Introducing the interactive models, the estimates                                                                   18 Social democratic parties were omitted as the reference category in all models. 
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largely lend support to the second hypothesis. Regarding Alesina and 
Ardagna’s (2009) approach, the RSP variable’s marginal effect in different 
time periods are depicted on Figure 4. The point estimates of the RSP 
variable are negative in both neutral and consolidation periods, consistent 
with the conditional hypothesis, but turn positive in times of fiscal 
expansion. In other words, only in times of relative prosperity do 
incumbents reward their own constituencies while in more austere periods, 
the Nixon-goes-to-China effect holds. 
 
Figure 4. Marginal effects with point estimates and 95% confidence interval for 
the RSP_pensioner variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model I 
 
 
 
The same pattern emerges from the second interactive model where the capb 
variable is interacted with the RSP measure in a continuous form. Point 
estimates and confidence intervals for different annual changes in the capb 
are shown on Figure 5.   Once the annual change in the capb is greater than -
1 of potential GDP, incumbents with higher relative support among 
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pensioners cut old-age spending more (expand it less) than incumbents with 
lower relative support among pensioners. 
 
Figure 5. Marginal effects with point estimates and 95% confidence interval for the 
RSP pensioner variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model II 
 
 
 
Proceeding to unemployment benefits programmes, Table 2 presents the 
main findings. Since we are including the lagged dependent variable among 
the set of regressors to take into account autocorrelation and dynamics, the 
coefficient estimates now have a slightly different reading. The estimates for 
the exogenous variables only provide the instantaneous effect; to understand 
the long-run cumulative effect, one has to take into account the effect of the 
regressors on the partial adjustment process in the dependent variable via 
the autoregressive term (Kittel and Winner, 2005). The long-run relationship 
between X and Y will be given by: 𝛽21−𝛽1 where β2 and β1 are the estimated 
coefficients on the exogenous and the autoregressive term, respectively (Beck 
and Katz, 2011). 
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Table 2. Models explaining unemployment-benefit spending in OECD countries†  Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.Δunemploymentbenefits 0.303 0.337 0.292 0.295  (7.43)*** (11.09)*** (9.79)*** (9.59)*** RSP_workers -0.046 -0.062 -0.127 -0.063  (1.79)* (6.02)*** (8.03)*** (4.41)*** growth -0.008 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005  (2.07)** (0.60) (1.11) (0.99) 
Δunemployment 0.055 0.054 0.057 0.058  (6.41)*** (9.91)*** (9.41)*** (9.32)*** conservative  0.037 0.032 0.033   (3.73)*** (3.32)*** (3.21)*** christdem  0.029 0.033 0.031   (2.82)*** (3.45)*** (3.01)*** liberal  0.064 0.065 0.064   (4.66)*** (4.64)*** (4.56)*** other  -0.044 0.037 0.032   (1.46) (1.14) (0.88) Consolidation   -0.011  
   (0.80)  Expansion   0.041     (2.26)**  RSP_workers*Consolidation   0.124     (2.66)***  RSP_workers*Expansion   0.281     (3.05)***  
Δcapb    -0.003     (0.68) 
RSP_workers* Δcapb    -0.007     (0.44) 
R2 0.47 0.48 0.54 0.53 
N 472 397 375 375 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors(t-statistics in parenthesis). 
 
As it can be seen from table 2, in all three models the effect of worker-specific 
RSP is statistically significant in the expected direction (albeit only 
marginally so in the baseline model).  The long-run relationship between 
RSP and the dependent variable, however is considerably greater than the 
point estimates. Calculating from the extended model, for instance, 
𝛽2
1−𝛽1 implies a long-run effect of -0.09% of GDP, augmenting the short-run 
(instant) effect by a factor of 1/3. In other words, while moving from an 
incumbent with -0.5 RSP among workers to one with 0.5 among them 
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implies an instantaneous cut in unemployment benefits amounting to 0.06% 
GDP, the full effect felt over the years (assuming unchanged incumbency 
and values of other variables in the model) increases to 0.09%. In contrast to 
the pension models, the party family variables are significant at the 1% level 
with the surprising finding that christian-democrats, liberals and 
conservatives all cut the program less (or expand it more) than their social-
democratic rivals. That said, the Nixon-goes-to-China phenomenon holds 
even after controlling for these party families: the RSP coefficient, if 
anything, increases in size and significance when party families are taken 
into account. Similar to the pensioner models, while structural variables – 
growth and the change in unemployment rates – are highly significant in the 
expected direction, the political constraints index as a proxy for the political 
opportunity space to enact retrenchment is non-significant and therefore I 
omitted it from the final specifications. 
 
Turning to the interactive models, a qualitatively similar pattern emerges to 
the pensioner models. Figure 6 shows the point estimates and 95% 
confidence interval for the RSP_worker variable under different fiscal 
stances. Again, the point estimates suggest that only during times of fiscal 
expansion do incumbents reward their low-skilled working age constituency 
when they enjoy high relative support among them. That said, the estimate 
marginally falls short of significance at the 5% level. The point estimate is 
slightly below 0 during times of consolidation and is both substantially and 
statistically highly significant in neutral times. On the other hand, no 
interactive effect is found in the second interactive specification: while the 
interaction between the capb and the RSP variable is signed in the expected 
(negative) direction, the point estimate is very close to 0 and non-significant. 
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Figure 6. Marginal effects with point estimates and 95 % confidence interval for 
the RSP_worker variable under different fiscal stances from Interactive model I 
 
 
To sum up our findings thus far, plenty of evidence for the baseline Nixon-
goes-to-China hypothesis (Hb) has been found. Most importantly, in all our 
models on the two core welfare programmes, high relative support among 
the main beneficiaries is associated with deeper cuts (smaller expansions) in 
the respective programmes. As far as the conditional version of the Nixon 
goes-to-China hypothesis (Hc) is concerned, the evidence holds, albeit in 
varying degrees for the two groups. 
 
Do these findings extend to a broader understanding of group-specific 
interests? As a first robustness check of our prior results, the same models 
have been re-estimated for the broader welfare categories for pensioners and 
workers, respectively. For welfare programmes representing a broader set of 
pensioners’ interest – including health and survivor benefits – the results 
(shown in the Appendix)19 are not qualitatively different from the core                                                                   19 Marginal effects plot for models on the broader spending items are available upon request 
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models20. The size of the estimated coefficients is larger (probably reflecting 
the larger size of this broader set of programmes) and they are significant at 
the 5% level in all the models. Moreover, both interactive models indicate an 
almost identical pattern on the conditioning impact of the fiscal stance to the 
core models. Turning to workers-related programmes, the baseline model 
provides similarly strong evidence for the first hypothesis as the core models 
did. In the extended model, when party family labels are included, the 
estimated coefficient for workers’ RSP now falls short of significance at the 
5% level (however it is still significant at the 10% level). The interactive 
models, on the other hand lend little support to the conditional hypothesis:  
the point estimates are below 0 in all three types of fiscal episodes. Similarly, 
in the second interactive model, while the point estimate of the interaction 
turn is in the expected (negative) direction, it fails to achieve statistical 
significance. 
 
Returning to our core models, a further round of robustness check examined 
the stability of the estimated coefficients after fixed-effect estimations. As the 
tables in the Appendix show, the substantive results hold after restricting the 
analysis to within-country variation under the fixed-effect estimates. The 
estimated size of the RSP coefficient is halved in the pension models but still 
achieves significance at the 5% level in the extended model. The worker-
specific RSP is practically the same in size and significance terms compared 
to the random-effects estimates for unemployment benefits. As far as the 
interactive specifications are concerned, the general patterns and the 
strength of the statistical evidence are broadly similar to the random effects 
models. It seems, therefore, that our main results obtained earlier are 
                                                                  20 Contrary to the core models, I was now unable to reject no first-order serial correlation with this new dependent variable (p<0.05). I thus included a lagged dependent variable which, however, did not substantively change the coefficients of interest. 
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unlikely to be driven by omitted country-specific characteristics that the 
random-effects models failed to capture. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
How partisanship shapes welfare preferences of different incumbent 
governments has long been one of the primary interests of welfare state 
scholars. Electoral considerations in most of these accounts have been 
implicit at best with highly pessimistic expectations: welfare state 
retrenchment should be inherently unpopular so even conservative 
governments with a clear electoral mandate often shy away from it. This 
article has offered an alternative view which attempts to bridge the gap 
between these expectations and contrary findings of the fiscal adjustment 
literature. Building on the qualitatively different nature of retrenchment 
politics inspired by the New Politics literature, I argued that once partisan 
biases behind different governments are taken into account, one can make 
sense of high re-election probabilities of retrenching governments. 
Specifically, I set out to test the hypothesis that high relative support 
propensity among certain social groups leads to deeper cuts (more limited 
expansions) of welfare programmes that primarily serve the interests of 
these groups.   
 
The findings from a set of 25 OECD countries provided strong support for 
the baseline hypothesis (Hb) on the Nixon-in-China effect in the context of 
“permanent austerity”. Over recent decades, high relative support among 
pensioners have, on average, been associated with deeper cuts (more limited 
expansions) in public pension programmes on the one hand and in a broader 
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set of welfare entitlements – health care and survivor benefits – on the other. 
A similar pattern has been found for welfare programmes that primarily 
benefit low-status working age individuals. A high relative support 
propensity among them has been associated, on average, with deeper cuts 
(more limited expansions) in unemployment programmes on the one hand, 
and in a broader set of welfare programmes – family benefits, incapacity 
benefits and active labour market policies – on the other.   
 
A second hypothesis (Hc) investigated whether this effect is uniform over 
time or whether it holds only in periods when retrenchment pressure is 
perceived particularly acute. On the balance, the evidence have been mixed 
in this regard: for our core welfare measures – unemployment benefits, and 
old age pension expenditure  - during fiscal expansions incumbents appear 
to compensate their core constituencies for painful policies they inflict on 
them in hard times. The conditional hypothesis, however, has received 
weaker support once we employed our broader measure of group-specific 
welfare policies. 
 
In addition to these main findings, one important contribution to the welfare 
state debate that this paper had to offer was a reconsideration of 
partisanship. In the models that controlled for party family labels, the 
estimated impact of group-specific support propensity has been at least as 
strong as in the baseline models. Taken together with the descriptive 
patterns offered in an earlier section of this paper, we can confidently state 
that traditional party family labels lump together a highly diverse set of 
parties as far as their underlying electoral constituencies are concerned. It 
would be thus fruitful for future empirical investigations of partisanship to 
take into account this electoral heterogeneity both across and within party 
families. 
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A second conclusion – in the footsteps of Schelkle (2012), among others - that 
follows from this is the need for a more disaggregated view of the welfare 
state than has been often the case in many empirical works. Highly 
aggregate variables, such as social spending or general government 
expenditures give us little guidance for times of severe budgetary trade-offs 
when the expansion/maintenance of a given social program may inevitably 
entail cuts in another one. The evolution of program-specific spending (or 
the institutional parameters – eligibility criteria, replacement rates etc. – that 
define the functioning of the program) is therefore more conducive to 
gaining a fine-grained understanding of welfare state politics. 
 
Finally, the obvious next step that my argument calls for is the investigation 
of the micro-level dynamics of welfare programmes. Specifically, the 
individual-level determinants of vote-switching between elections during 
retrenchment would offer valuable insights into the understanding of 
partisan biases among the electorate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
   40 
References   
Adams, J. (2001). Party Competition and Responsible Party Government: A Theory of Spatial 
Competition Based upon Insights from Behavioral Voting Research. Ann Arbor, MI: University of 
Michigan Press. 
Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 102 (3): 651-78. 
Alesina, A. & Ardagna, S. (2009). Large Changes in Fiscal Policy. Taxes versus Spending. NBER 
Working Paper Series,15438 
Alesina, A., Ardagna, S. &  Trebbi, F. (2006). Who adjusts and when? On the political economy of 
reforms. NBER Working Paper Series,12049. 
Alesina, A.,   Carloni, D. & Lecce, G. (2011). The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments. 
NBER Working Paper Series, 17655. 
Alesina, A.,   Perotti, R.   Tavares, J.,  Obstfeld, M. & Eichengreen, B. (1998). The Political Economy of 
Fiscal Adjustments. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1:197-266. 
Alford, R.R. (1963). Party and Society. Chicago, Ill: Rand McNally 
Allan, J.P. & Scruggs, L. (2004). Political Partisanship and Welfare State Reform in Advanced Industrial 
Societies. American Journal of Political Science 48 (3): 496–512. 
Bartels, B.L. (2008). Beyond "fixed versus random effects": a framework for improving substantive and 
statistical analysis of panel, time-series cross-sectional, and multilevel data. Paper presented at the 
Political Methodology Conference at Ann Arbor, MI. 
Beck, N. (2001).Time-Series—Cross-Sectional Data: What Have We Learned in the Past Few Years? 
Annual Review of Political Science 4:271-93 
Beck, N. &  Katz, J.N. (1995).What To Do (And Not To Do) With Time–Series Cross–Section Data. 
American Political Science Review 89 (3):634–47 
———(2011). Modeling Dynamics in Time-Series-Cross-Section Political Economy Data”. Annual 
Review of Political Science 14: 331-52 
Bonoli, G. (2001). Political Institutions, Veto Points, and the Process of Welfare State Adaptation, in 
Pierson, Paul (ed.) The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 314-337 
———(2005). The Politics of the new social policies: providing coverage against new social risks in 
mature welfare states. Policy and Politics 33 (3): 431-449.    
Bradley, D. Huber, E.  Moller, S., Nielsen, F. &  Stevens, J.D. (2003). Distribution and Redistribution in 
Postindustrial Democracies. World Politics 55 (2):193–228. 
Brender, Adi & Drazen, A. (2008). How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Re-election 
Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries. American Economic Review 98 (5): 2203-2220. 
Budge, I. & Bara, J. (2001). Manifesto-Based Research: A Critical Review. In Budge et al (2001). Mapping 
Policy Preferences: 50-73. 
Abel Bojar 
41      
Busemeyer, M.R. (2012). Inequality and the Political Economy of Education: An Analysis of Individual 
Preferences in OECD Countries. Journal of European Social Policy 22 (3): 219-40. 
Castles, F. (2007). The Disappearing State? Retrenchment Realities in an Age of Globalization. Edward 
Elgar Publishing: Northampton, Mass.  
Clark, T. N. & Lipset, S.M. (1991). Are Social Classes Dying? International Sociology 6 (4): 397–410. 
Cukierman, A. & Tomassi, M. (1998). When Does it Take a Nixon to Go to China? American Economic 
Review 88 (1): 180-97. 
Cusack, T. (2001). Partisanship in the Setting and Coordination of Fiscal and Monetary Policies. 
European Journal of Political Research 40 (1): 93-115. 
Cusack, T.,  Iversen,T. & Rehm, P. (2006). Risks at Work: The Demand and Supply Sides of Government 
Redistribution. Oxford Revenue of Economic Policy 22 (3): 365-389. 
Drazen, A. (2008). Political Budget Cycles. In Steven N. Durlauf and Lawrence E. Blumeeds. The New 
Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. Second Edition. Palgrave Macmillan. 
Dreher, A.(2006). Does Globalization Affect Growth? Evidence from a new index of Globalizaiton. 
Applied Economics 38 (10): 1091-1110. 
Duch, R.M. & T. Stevenson, R.T. (2008). The Economic Vote. N.Y.: Cambridge University Press 
Esping-Anderson, G. (1990). The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. N.J.: Princeton University Press 
Evans, G. (2000). The Continued Significance of Class Voting. Annual Review of Political Science 3: 401-
17. 
Evans, G. &  Tilley, J. (2011). How parties shape class politics: Explaining the decline of class party 
support. British Journal of Political Science 42 (1): 137-71. 
——— (2012). The Depoliticization of Inequality and Redistribution: Explaining the Decline of Class 
Voting. Journal of Politics 74 (4): 963-976. 
Evans, G. & De Graaf, N.D. (2013). Political Choice Matters: Examining Social and Political Change in 
Cross-National Perspective. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Finseraas, H. & Vernby, K. (2011). What Parties Are and what Parties Do: Partisanship and Welfare State 
Reform in an Era of Austerity. Socio-Economic Review 9(4): 613–38. 
Garrett, G.(1998). Global Markets and National Politics. International Organization 52 (4): 787-824. 
Garrett, G. & Mitchell, D. (2001). Globalization, Government Spending and Taxation in the OECD. 
European Journal of Political Research 39 (2): 145-77. 
Giger, N. (2010). Do Voters Punish the Government for Welfare State Retrenchment? A Comparative 
Study of Electoral Costs Associated with Social Policy. Comparative European Politics 8 (4): 415-443 
Giger, N. & Nelson, M. (2011). The Electoral Consequences of Welfare State Retrenchment: Blame 
Avoidance or Credit Claiming in the Era of Permanent Austerity? European Journal of Political 
Research 50 (1): 1-23 
Green-Pedersen, C. (2004). The Dependent Variable Problem within the Study of Welfare-state 
Retrenchment: Defining the Problem and Looking for Solutions. Journal of Comparative Policy 
Analysis 6 (1): 3–14. 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
   42 
Green-Pedersen, C. & Haverland, M. (2002). The New Politics of the Welfare State and the New 
Scholarship of the Welfare State. Journal of European Social Policy 12 (1): 243-51. 
Hacker, J. (2002). The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the 
United States. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
———(2004). Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social 
Policy Retrenchment in the United States. American Political Science Review 98 (2): 243-60. 
von Hagen, J.,   Hallett, H.A.  & Strauch, R. (2002). Budgetary Consolidation in Europe: Quality, 
Economic Conditions, and Persistence.Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 16 (4): 
512-535 
Hallerberg, M.,  Strauch, R. & Jürgen von Hagen, J. (2009). Fiscal Governance: Evidence from Europe. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Haupt, A. B. (2010). Parties’ Responses to Economic Globalization: What is Left for the Left and Right 
for the Right? Party Politics 16 (1): 5-27. 
Häusermann, S. (2010). The Politics of Welfare State Reform in Continental Europe: Modernization in 
Hard Times. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Henisz, W.J. 2006. Polcon_2005 Codebook. 
        http://www-management.wharton.upenn.edu/henisz/ (last accessed: 19/05/2014) 
Hibbs, D. A. Jr. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 
71 (4): 1467-87. 
Howard, C. (1997). The Hidden Welfare State: Tax Expenditures and Social Policy in the United States. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
Huber, E. &. Stevens, J.D. (2001). Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Chicago, Ill: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Illera, R. M. &  Mulas-Granado, C. (2001). Duration of Fiscal Consolidations in the European Union. 
Working Papers, FEDEA. 
Iversen, T. & Cusack, T. (2000).The Causes of Welfare State Expansion: Deindustrialization or 
Globalization? World Politics 52 (3): 313-49 
Iversen, T. Anne Wren, A. (1998). Equality, Employment and Budgetary Restraint: The Trilemma of the 
Service Economy. World Politics 50 (4): 507-46. 
Jahn, D. (2006). Globalization as Galton's Problem: The Missing Link in the Analysis of the Diffusion 
Patterns in Welfare State Development. International Organization 60 (2): 401-31 
Kenworthy, L. & McCall, L. (2008). Inequality, Public Opinion, and 
Redistribution. Socio-Economic Review 6 (1): 35-68 
Kim, H. & Fording, R.C. (2002).Government Partisanship in Western Democracies, 1945-1998. European 
Journal of Political Research 41 (2): 187-206. 
Kitschelt, H. (1994). The Transformation of European Social Democracy. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Abel Bojar 
43      
———(2001). Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose 
Unpopular Policies? in Pierson, Paul, eds. The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press 
Kittel, B. & Winner, H. (2005).  How Reliable is Pooled Analysis in Political Economy? The 
Globalization-Welfare State Nexus Revisited. European Journal of Political Research 44 (2): 269-293 
Kittel, B. & Obinger, H. (2003). Political Parties, Institutions, and the Dynamics of Social Expenditure in 
Times of Austerity. Journal of European Public Policy 10 (1): 20-45. 
Korpi, W. (1983). The Democratic Class Struggle. London, UK: Routledge&Kegan Paul. 
Korpi, W. & Palme, J. (2003). New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of Austerity and 
Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975-1995. American Political Science Review 
97 (3): 425-46. 
Kwon, H.Y. &  Jonas Pontusson, J. (2005). The Rise and Fall of Government 
Partisanship: Dynamics of Social Spending in OECD Countries, 1962-2000. Unpublished Manuscript. 
Laver, M. &   Shepsle, K.A. (1990).Coalitions and Cabinet Government.American Political Science 
Review 84(3): 873-90.  
Leibniz Institute for Social Sciences (2013). Zacat-Gesis Online Study Catalogue: 
http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/. Last accessed: 03/09/2013. 
Lipset, S. M. & Rokkan, S. (1967). Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives. 
N.Y./London: Free Press 
Meinhard, S. & Potrafke, N. (2012). The Globalization-Welfare State Nexus Reconsidered. Review of 
International Economics 20 (2): 271-287. 
Moene, K.O. & Wallerstein, M. (2001). Inequality, Social Insurance, and Redistribution. American 
Political Science Review 95 (4): 859-874. 
Mulas-Granados, C. (2006). Economics, Politics, and Budgets: The Political Economy of Fiscal 
Consolidations in Europe. Basingstoke and N. Y.: Palgrave-MacMillan Publishing, Co. 
Obinger, H. (2002). Veto Players, Political Parties and Welfare-State Retrenchment in Austria. 
International Journal of Political Economy 32 (2): 44-66. 
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (2013). Social Expenditure Database: 
http://www.oecd.org/els/soc/socialexpendituredatabasesocx.htm. Last accessed: 03/09/2013. 
Palier, B. (2002). Governer la sécurité sociale: les réformes du systéme francais de protection sociale 
depuis 1945. Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 
Pierson, P. (1994). Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and the Politics of Retrenchment. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
———(1996).The New Politics of the Welfare State. World politics 48 (2): 143-179. 
———(1998). Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects: Post-Industrial Welfare States Confront Permanent 
Austerity. Journal of European Public Policy 5 (4): 539-60. 
——— eds. (2001).The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Biting the Hand that Feeds 
   44 
Powell, B.G. &  Whitten, G.D. (1993). A cross-national analysis of economic voting: taking account of the 
political context. American Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 391-414. 
Rehm, P. (2011). Social Policy by Popular Demand. World Politics 63 (2): 271-299. 
Rodrik, D. (1997). Has Globalization Gone Too Far?Peterson Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC. 
Ross, F. (2000). Beyond Left and Right: The New Partisan Politics of Welfare. Governance 13 (2): 155-83. 
Rueda, D. (2005). Insider-Outsider Politics in Industrialized Democracies: The Challenge to Social 
Democratic Parties. American Political Science Review 99 (1): 61-74. 
Starke, P. (2006). The Politics of Welfare State Retrenchment: A Literature Review. Social Policy & 
Administration 40 (1): 104-120. 
Schelkle, W. (2012). Collapsing Worlds and Varieties of welfare capitalism: In search of a new political 
economy of welfare. LSE “European in Question” Discussion Paper Series 54. 
Swank, D. (2005). Globalisation, Domestic Politics, and Welfare State Retrenchment in Capitalist 
Democracies. Social Policy and Society 4(2): 183-95. 
Swank, D. & Steinmo, S. (2002). The New Political Economy of Taxation in Advanced Capitalist 
Democracies.American Journal of Political Science 46 (3): 642–55. 
Tepe, M. &  Vanhuysse, P. (2009). Are Aging OECD Welfare States on the Path to the Politics of 
Gerontocracy? Evidence from 18 Democracies, 1980–2002. Journal of Public Policy 29(1): 1–28. 
Ward, H.,  Ezrow, L. &   Dorussen, H. (2011). Globalization, Party Positions, and the Median Voter. 
World Politics 63 (3): 509-47 
              
Abel Bojar 
45      
Appendix 
 
Construction of RSP series 
 
As indicated in the text, RSP for the three social groups for a given party for a 
given year was defined by RSPgp= Vgp-VtpVtp . The categorization of respondents 
into the two social groups of interest were based on the survey questions on 
respondents’ occupation/and or job status. From the Eurobarometer series I 
classified respondents into pensioners (answering “retired” to the survey 
questions) and workers (answering “manual skilled worker”, “manual 
unskilled worker” and “other unskilled worker”). The ISSP series allowed a 
more systematic classification of respondents relying on ILO-ISCO (4 digit) 
categories where higher categories indicate lower “status”. This was cross-
validated by comparing self-reported family income across the major 
occupational groups.  
 
Accordingly, workers comprised the last 3 of the 9 main categories. 
 
7) Craft and related trades workers,  
8) Plant and machine operators,  
9) Elementary occupations. 
 
Pensioners, similarly to the Eurobarometer series, were classified by another 
survey question on occupation status. 
 
The general rule I followed to ensure as much consistency as possible is to 
use the Eurobarometer trend file from its beginning until its end in 2002 (vote 
intention questions were interrupted in that year and subsequent 
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Eurobarometer surveys did not include that question). Following 2002 I 
switched to the ISSP files. For countries that had little or no Eurobarometer 
coverage I extended the ISSP series further back in time until the earliest 
observation (generally in the early 90s). 
 
Table 3. Models explaining a broader measure of spending representing 
pensioners’ interest in OECD countries†   Extended Interactive I Interactive II L.Δ.pensionerrisk 0.114 0.115 0.103  (1.31) (1.27) (1.21) RSP_pensioners -0.299 -0.482 -0.242  (2.28)** (3.15)*** (2.48)** Growth -0.054 -0.064 -0.060  (3.32)*** (3.77)*** (3.51)*** 
Δoldageratio 17.989 17.876 17.554  (0.88) (0.89) (0.94) Liberal 0.020 0.009 0.010  (0.30) (0.15) (0.20) Christdem 0.083 0.089 0.073  (1.77)* (1.75)* (1.45) Conservative -0.013 -0.031 -0.033  (0.20) (0.45) (0.54) Other -0.250 -0.222 -0.197  (1.77)* (1.62) (1.36) Consolidation  -0.192    (2.50)**  RSP_pensioners*Consolidation  0.423    (1.98)**  Expansion  -0.118    (1.24)  RSP_pensioners*Expansion  1.437    (3.08)***  
Δcapb   -0.028    (1.49) 
RSP_pensioners* Δcapb   -0.158    (1.83)* 
R2 0.26 0.30 0.30 
N 403 382 382 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors(t-statistics in parenthesis).        
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Table 4. Models explaining a broader measure of spending representing workers’ 
interest in OECD countries†  Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.Δworkerrisk 0.216 0.245 0.235  (2.02)** (2.00)** (2.04)** RSP_workers -0.215 -0.223 -0.171  (1.73)* (1.69)* (1.58) growth -0.014 -0.026 -0.025  (0.90) (1.53) (1.51) 
Δunemployment 0.042 0.011 0.012  (0.69) (0.17) (0.17) liberal 0.086 0.077 0.071  (1.10) (0.92) (0.84) christdem 0.049 0.025 0.025  (0.75) (0.36) (0.37) conservative 0.087 0.057 0.062  (1.47) (0.89) (1.00) other -0.153 -0.163 -0.150  (1.13) (1.10) (1.03) Consolidation  -0.063    (1.22)  Expansion  0.139    (1.80)*  RSP_workers*Consolidation  0.086    (0.51)  RSP_workers*Expansion  0.152    (0.64)  
Δcapb   -0.040    (3.68)*** 
RSP_workers* Δcapb   -0.025    (0.69) 
R2 0.39 0.43 0.43 
N 360 343 343 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are random -effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors (t-statistics in parenthesis). 
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Table 5. Models explaining old-age spending in OECD countries under fixed-
effects estimation†  Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II RSP_pensioners -0.100 -0.116 -0.173 -0.042  (1.36) (2.24)** (2.79)*** (0.78) growth -0.053 -0.052 -0.055 -0.051  (3.78)*** (7.25)*** (7.12)*** (6.39)*** Δoldageratio 42.272 44.959 35.027 34.168  (4.29)*** (3.11)*** (2.55)** (2.84)*** liberals -0.014 -0.008 -0.012   (0.26) (0.19) (0.33) conservatives  -0.063 -0.041 -0.040   (1.57) (1.02) (1.11) christiandemocrats  0.052 0.066 0.058   (1.84)* (2.14)** (1.99)** others  -0.107 -0.083 -0.083   (2.19)** (2.07)** (1.96)** Consolidation   -0.074     (2.22)**  Expansion   -0.046     (1.34)  RSP_pensioners*Consolidation   0.264     (2.97)***  RSP_pensioners*Expansion   1.011     (6.90)***  
Δcapb    -0.017     (2.13)** 
RSP_pensioners* Δcapb    -0.100     (2.77)*** 
R2 0.25 0.28 0.33 0.32 
N 489 415 392 392 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
† The coefficients are fixed-effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors (t-statistics in parenthesis).                   
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Table 6. Models explaining unemployment-benefit spending in OECD countries 
under fixed-effects estimation†  Baseline Extended Interactive I Interactive II 
L.Δunemploymentbenefits 0.281 0.324 0.283 0.283  (6.78)*** (10.94)*** (9.24)*** (8.88)*** RSP_workers -0.019 -0.043 -0.101 -0.043  (0.78) (2.57)** (5.57)*** (2.68)*** Growth -0.012 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012  (2.54)** (1.51) (2.00)** (1.86)* 
Δunemployment 0.051 0.050 0.052 0.052  (5.81)*** (9.95)*** (7.15)*** (7.76)*** Liberals 0.068 0.061 0.062   (5.11)*** (4.39)*** (4.28)*** Conservatives  0.030 0.025 0.025   (2.84)*** (2.36)** (2.22)** Christiandemocrats  0.029 0.034 0.031   (2.71)*** (3.22)*** (2.75)*** Others  -0.037 0.035 0.031   (1.10) (1.04) (0.80) Expansion   0.038     (2.02)**  Consolidation   -0.011     (0.86)  RSP_workers*Expansion   0.300     (3.40)***  RSP_workers*Consolidation   0.123     (2.65)***  
Δcapb    -0.003     (0.66) 
RSP_workers* Δcapb    -0.008     (0.51) 
R2 0.49 0.51 0.56 0.55 
N 472 397 375 375 
p<0.1* p<0.05; ** p<0.01*** 
†The coefficients are fixed-effects estimates with a set of time dummies and panel-corrected standard errors (t-statistics in parenthesis).   
Table 7. Data Sources  Variables Source Programme-Specific Spending OECD Social Expenditure Database RSP Eurobarometer Trend-File, ISSP Cyclically Adjusted Primary Balance of General Government OECD Economic Outlook database no. 84, no. 92 Economic and Structural Control variables (growth, unemployment, old-age ratio) OECD i.library, Eurostat Party Family Labels Comparative Political Dataset, University of Bern 
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Table 8. Diagnostic test-results*                 Test           Dependent Variable              Test-statistic, p-value  F-test for unit-specific effects Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending  
F-statistic=0.97 P-value= 0.5084 F-statistic=1.46 P-value=0.0767 F-test for time-specific effects Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending  
F-statistic: 2.91 P-value<0.0001 F-statistic: 1.79 P-value=0.0109 Hausman-test Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending   
F-statistic=8.05 P-value=0.3279 Chi-square statistic=4.8 P-value=0.6841 Modified Wald-test for group-wise heteroskedasticity Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending    
Chi-square statistic=21435.48 P-value<0.0001 Chi-square statistic=1700.08 P-value<0.0001 Pesaran-test for cross-sectional dependence Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending    
CD-statistic=2.671 P-value=0.0076 CD-statistic=1.199 P-value=0.2307   Wooldridge (Lagrange Multiplier) test for first-order serial correlation Unemployment benefits  Old-age spending    
F-statistic=27.572 P-value<0.0001 F-statistic=0.656 P-value=0.426   *Diagnostic tests were conducted based on the extended models.   
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